Negotiating the return of South Africa’s title deed

SHORTLY after the crazy announcement by the Eskom board that Brian Molefe, the ex-CEO of Eskom, would return to the job he vacated under a cloud last December, a “message”, purporting to come from Atul Gupta, one of the Gupta brothers, began circulating on social media.

Printed on letterheads of the South African president and addressed to fellow South Africans, it read thus: “…Now that the heat is off Brian Molefe (thanks to now suspended CEO Mr Matshela Koko) I have decided to redeploy Mr Molefe back to Eskom where we wanted him all along.

"It is very important to always put people you can trust in the nation’s SOEs (state-owned enterprises) to look after one’s the nation’s (sic) best interest” (italics are mine).

Such is the influence of this family on state affairs that most, if not all, key appointments to boards of parastatals and government positions are thought to be orchestrated by the president’s family friends to advance their interests and, by default, those of the president and, perhaps, fellow South Africans.

Octopus-like grip on Zuma

It’s hard to credibly dispute their octopus-like grip on the president, such that it would be foolhardy to isolate Jacob Zuma’s fate from theirs. To put this differently, perhaps time has arrived to consider a deal with them directly to reclaim South Africa.

At the height of the civil war in Mozambique, Samora Machel, then Mozambique’s leader, famously rejected further talks with the Renamo rebels, suggesting instead that he would rather negotiate directly with the Pretoria regime as the puppet master or organ grinder. 

A significant body of evidence, albeit still circumstantial and anecdotal, now exists; and it points to the pervasive influence of this family in the running of the country. A few days after the Molefe announcement, amaBhungane, the investigative journalism outfit, disclosed that Molefe and Eskom chairperson Ben Ngubane had tried and failed to strong-arm Ngoako Ramatlhodi, then mineral resources minister, to suspend licences belonging to Glencore, the commodities trader which supplied coal to Eskom.

Despite the standard flimsy denials, we now know two things for sure: first, Ramatlhodi was inexplicably removed from his post in favour of Mosebenzi Zwane; and second, his was one of the scalps that Zuma claimed in his midnight Cabinet reshuffle.

In subsequent interviews, the former premier of Limpopo has disclosed further interactions with Duduzane, Zuma’s son and a business associate of the Gupta family. These disclosures come just a few months after Mcebisi Jonas, another victim of the March 31 reshuffle, disclosed how he had been offered, and declined, the finance ministry job by the Gupta family in late 2015 in exchange for money and some favours to the family.

Pieter-Louis Myburgh, a journalist at News24, has published a useful book, The Republic of Gupta, A Story of State Capture, which provides a historical context to what has become monthly disclosures about the influence of this family.

The South African Council of Churches recently released a preliminary report, compiled by the Unburdening Panel, providing more evidence of state capture or undue influence by non-state actors, such as the Gupta family.

It is significant to mention that the religious leaders’ report was prompted by failure of the ANC to investigate the family’s influence, and most people felt unsafe to appear before a Luthuli House inquiry. As it happens, one of the panel’s participants, Vytjie Mentor, couldn’t attend the Regina Mundi presentation thanks to security concerns.

Is the president still in charge of SA?

A picture that’s emerging suggests a few worrying points: first, the family’s business interests are outsized by their influence; second, their business model is too opaque; and third and more concerning, there are serious doubts that Zuma is still in charge of the country.

The latter means that his value is now limited to protecting them while still in office. And, by implication then, the family would have direct and material interest in him serving out his term (as president of the republic) and in ensuring that the December conference of the ANC produces an outcome that protects this parallel state.

Post-reshuffle, Gwede Mantashe effectively conceded that the reshuffle was compiled elsewhere, and his reaction to the Eskom debacle further betrays a sense of helplessness for a man who’s, nominally, the administrative head of the ruling party.

By backing and campaigning for former African Union chairperson Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma to succeed him in December, Zuma has made it clear that this is an outcome that will defend the parallel state arrangement. In fact, the former AU chair has done nothing to distance herself from Zuma’s friends or pronounce on state capture.

Conversely, Cyril Ramaphosa has been emphatic about denouncing state capture, and has supported a judicial commission of inquiry. If he wins in December, he could disrupt the operations of the parallel state. For a start, he could call an early election to ensure the ANC, which is bleeding support, manages a decent showing in 2019.

Zuma’s Stalingrad tactics

This would also put an end to Zuma’s Stalingrad tactics on dealing with state capture. The North Gauteng High Court will hear his appeal against recommendations by former Public Protector Thuli Madonsela in October.

In what is seen as a delaying tactic, Zuma wants to retain his power to appoint the judge to lead a judicial commission of inquiry, even though he himself would be the subject of the probe.

If Ramaphosa loses, the appeal-on-appeal by Zuma will continue, further delaying the commission’s establishment towards the end of his term of office in 2019. By that time, the ANC won’t have appetite for another damaging set of pre-election disclosures.

By then, state capturers might have left the country, perhaps with the title deed to our country too. For their part, the Guptas are on record as supporting the inquiry and wanting to sell their businesses – ANN7, The New Age, mining and computer interests.

But the fact that they’ve missed their self-imposed deadline of December 2016 suggests that the announcement was meant to deflect attention from themselves, after commercial banks closed their accounts.

The SA Communist Party wants their citizenship revoked. Julius Malema doesn’t want to see them either. It’s hard to see how they can legally be driven back to India without some protracted due process.

What South Africa is going through isn’t unique. South Korea went through the same recently. The difference is speed; its parliament swiftly impeached the president. Today Park Geun-hye, the president, is sitting in a jail cell alongside Choi Soon-sil, the woman she sold her country to, and the acting chairperson of Samsung.     

In South Africa, on the other hand, the anti-capture movement is proceeding very slowly, and in a fragmented fashion. Even if the state capturers were conclusively fingered, chances of their prosecution look slim with the current dysfunction among law enforcement agencies.

So, what is to be done? Perhaps, it is time we considered approaching the state capturers directly to negotiate the return of our title deed?

* John Dludlu is a former editor of the Sowetan and founder of Orwell Advisory Services. Opinions expressed are his own.