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THE Russian occupation of the Crimea, such is the consensus among international observers, was driven by geopolitical considerations as seen in the Kremlin.
The fact that President Vladimir Putin has shrunk back from sending his army into the eastern regions of the Ukraine, observers also agree, is due to economic reasons – the fear of economic sanctions.
The whole crisis surrounding Russia, the Ukraine and the Crimea is a classic example of how geopolitics and economics interact in the international arena.
Of course, there is the fact that the peninsula used to be Russian territory until 1954, and that about 60% of its population are ethnic Russians. So, obviously, there is an emotional dimension to the Russian action.
But Putin is not known to be a man led by emotion, although he exploits his countrymen’s feeling very ably. Rather, he is an ice-cold chess player. And as such, he is led by what he regards as Russia’s interests.
On the one hand, the Crimea is of vital geopolitical importance to Russia, given that Putin wants to elevate his country to the status of superpower once again. The Russian navy has effective control over the former Soviet naval base at Sevastopol in terms of a treaty between Russia and the Ukraine in 1997.
The Russian Black Sea fleet is based here. This fleet not only makes it possible to dominate Ukrainian, Georgian, Moldovian, Bulgarian and Romanian access to the sea, it is even a force Turkey has to reckon with in its naval planning.
Perhaps even more importantly, Sevastopol is the base which supports a rotating Russian naval squadron in the Mediterranean. In other words, it enables Russia to project its power far beyond its borders.
Ever since the 18th century, Russian foreign policy has been partly driven by an urge to reach “warm waters” to facilitate its access to the world's oceans. Sevastopol makes this possible - albeit with some difficulty - as Russian ships have to traverse the Bosphorus, for which Turkish permission is needed.
This explains why Putin was willing to withstand widespread international condemnation to take and hold the Crimea. But economic considerations explain why he – at any rate for the time being – is not willing to go further and occupy the overwhelmingly Russian-speaking eastern regions of the Ukraine, as was feared in the West for a few days.
This is relevant in the light of Western threats to impose economic sanctions on Russia because of the Crimea.
During the Cold War, the Soviet Union and its satellite states behind the Iron Curtain practised a certain measure of economic autarchy to remain independent of the capitalist West.
This started crumbling - especially in the last 15 to 20 years before the end of the Communst empire in 1989-91 - as agriculture in the Soviet Union imploded, forcing the Kremlin to import huge amounts of grain - ironically from the USA.
But since Communism was abandoned, the economic ties between West and Central Europe and Russia have blossomed.
The European Union imports about a third of its gas consumption from Russia. When the average German housewife starts cooking in the evening, chances are pretty good that the gas originated deep in the Siberian soil.
At the same time, Russia imports huge amounts of manufactured goods from Europe, as it frequently lacks the technological capability itself.
Without Russian gas, the European economy may grind to a standstill. At the same time, as the Russian economy is to a large extent dependent on the profits generated by the export of gas and the import of manufactured goods, it cannot really cut economic ties with Europe.
In other words, for Europe, it is – at any rate in the short term – not a serious option to impose more than symbolic economic sanctions against Russia. And Russia is not really in a position to retaliate.
Nevertheless, history has shown that mutual economic dependence between political rivals is not necessarily sufficient to prevent political confrontation or even war.
Before 1914, Europe went through a period of extraordinary economic integration, the level of which was only reached again in the 1970s.
And yet, the continent slid involuntarily into the enormous destruction of the First World War, because there were no mechanics to stop the domino effect of August 1914. The economic integration made the price which was eventually paid all the greater, but did not stop it.
Given Putin’s character as an ice-cold chess player (rather than Adolf Hitler’s as a reckless gambler), he most probably knows how far he can go. He knows that even his authoritarian government cannot survive in the long term without the economic well-being of ordinary Russians. And that will barely be possible without growing economic ties to the West.
The events surrounding the Crimea are an excellent illustration of the interplay between geopolitical and economic considerations. Nevertheless, we should never forget the lesson of 1914 ...
- Fin24
* Leopold Scholtz is an independent political analyst who lives in Europe. Views expressed are his own.
The fact that President Vladimir Putin has shrunk back from sending his army into the eastern regions of the Ukraine, observers also agree, is due to economic reasons – the fear of economic sanctions.
The whole crisis surrounding Russia, the Ukraine and the Crimea is a classic example of how geopolitics and economics interact in the international arena.
Of course, there is the fact that the peninsula used to be Russian territory until 1954, and that about 60% of its population are ethnic Russians. So, obviously, there is an emotional dimension to the Russian action.
But Putin is not known to be a man led by emotion, although he exploits his countrymen’s feeling very ably. Rather, he is an ice-cold chess player. And as such, he is led by what he regards as Russia’s interests.
On the one hand, the Crimea is of vital geopolitical importance to Russia, given that Putin wants to elevate his country to the status of superpower once again. The Russian navy has effective control over the former Soviet naval base at Sevastopol in terms of a treaty between Russia and the Ukraine in 1997.
The Russian Black Sea fleet is based here. This fleet not only makes it possible to dominate Ukrainian, Georgian, Moldovian, Bulgarian and Romanian access to the sea, it is even a force Turkey has to reckon with in its naval planning.
Perhaps even more importantly, Sevastopol is the base which supports a rotating Russian naval squadron in the Mediterranean. In other words, it enables Russia to project its power far beyond its borders.
Ever since the 18th century, Russian foreign policy has been partly driven by an urge to reach “warm waters” to facilitate its access to the world's oceans. Sevastopol makes this possible - albeit with some difficulty - as Russian ships have to traverse the Bosphorus, for which Turkish permission is needed.
This explains why Putin was willing to withstand widespread international condemnation to take and hold the Crimea. But economic considerations explain why he – at any rate for the time being – is not willing to go further and occupy the overwhelmingly Russian-speaking eastern regions of the Ukraine, as was feared in the West for a few days.
This is relevant in the light of Western threats to impose economic sanctions on Russia because of the Crimea.
During the Cold War, the Soviet Union and its satellite states behind the Iron Curtain practised a certain measure of economic autarchy to remain independent of the capitalist West.
This started crumbling - especially in the last 15 to 20 years before the end of the Communst empire in 1989-91 - as agriculture in the Soviet Union imploded, forcing the Kremlin to import huge amounts of grain - ironically from the USA.
But since Communism was abandoned, the economic ties between West and Central Europe and Russia have blossomed.
The European Union imports about a third of its gas consumption from Russia. When the average German housewife starts cooking in the evening, chances are pretty good that the gas originated deep in the Siberian soil.
At the same time, Russia imports huge amounts of manufactured goods from Europe, as it frequently lacks the technological capability itself.
Without Russian gas, the European economy may grind to a standstill. At the same time, as the Russian economy is to a large extent dependent on the profits generated by the export of gas and the import of manufactured goods, it cannot really cut economic ties with Europe.
In other words, for Europe, it is – at any rate in the short term – not a serious option to impose more than symbolic economic sanctions against Russia. And Russia is not really in a position to retaliate.
Nevertheless, history has shown that mutual economic dependence between political rivals is not necessarily sufficient to prevent political confrontation or even war.
Before 1914, Europe went through a period of extraordinary economic integration, the level of which was only reached again in the 1970s.
And yet, the continent slid involuntarily into the enormous destruction of the First World War, because there were no mechanics to stop the domino effect of August 1914. The economic integration made the price which was eventually paid all the greater, but did not stop it.
Given Putin’s character as an ice-cold chess player (rather than Adolf Hitler’s as a reckless gambler), he most probably knows how far he can go. He knows that even his authoritarian government cannot survive in the long term without the economic well-being of ordinary Russians. And that will barely be possible without growing economic ties to the West.
The events surrounding the Crimea are an excellent illustration of the interplay between geopolitical and economic considerations. Nevertheless, we should never forget the lesson of 1914 ...
- Fin24
* Leopold Scholtz is an independent political analyst who lives in Europe. Views expressed are his own.
