BRAZIL will have a tough time convincing its risk-averse
fellow Brics to bankroll a European rescue, no matter how the aid is structured.
Funnelling the money through the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
instead of buying European debt directly offers a layer of protection against
default. But India, China and Russia have already pledged a combined $70bn to augment
the IMF's lending power, and may be reluctant to do more.
A Brazilian official told Reuters that Finance Minister
Guido Mantega would propose that the Brics bloc of fast-growing economies make
billions of dollars in new funding available to the IMF. The Brics are
scheduled to meet in Washington on Thursday, ahead of the IMF’s twice-yearly
gathering.
With more than $4 trillion in reserves altogether, it is not surprising that China, Brazil, India and Russia have been cast in the role of Europe’s potential saviours should the debt crisis there deteriorate dramatically.
They may be financially able, but their willingness is in
doubt.
"It would be extraordinarily difficult for officials
managing the overseas assets of what are still relatively poor developing
countries to justify putting those assets at risk if Europe fails to get its
own act together," said Julian Jessop, chief international economist with
Capital Economics in London.
Even if Brazil got all the Brics on board, the funding would
probably amount to only a tiny portion of the IMF’s worst-case scenario lending
needs. The Brazilian official suggested Brazil might be able to provide $10bn
to help Europe.
IMF staff members estimated the fund had about $390bn it
could comfortably lend now, but might need to lend as much as $840bn, Reuters
reported on September 9.
This is not the first time Brazil has tried to rally its Brics
brethren around a cause. Earlier in September, Brazil's call for the big
emerging markets to buy more European debt drew a lukewarm response from Asia.
"Brazil has the tradition of coming up with catchy
headlines," said Wei Yao, an economist with Societe Generale in Hong Kong,
adding that Brazil's latest proposal may not be politically practical in China.
History of friction
Beijing has had some friction with the IMF, particularly
over the fund’s assessment of whether the yuan currency is substantially
undervalued.
There is also the matter of clout within the fund. China
secured its first top IMF management post just two months ago, even though it
is the world’s second largest economy.
All of the Brics fought hard for greater IMF voting power
and more say in decision-making. Last year, they won at least some of the
additional power they sought. Ironically, it was Europe that put up the biggest
objections and now finds itself needing emerging market support.
Much of Asia remains leery of the IMF and its advice, a
hangover from the 1990s Asian debt crisis when IMF loans came with tough
conditions that forced sharp government spending cuts. That is a primary reason
why many emerging economies built up vast reserves - as a form of self-insurance
so that they would never again have to rely on the IMF.
A decade later, many of those emerging markets found the IMF
looking to them for additional funding.
The People's Bank of China signed an agreement in 2009 to
buy $50bn in IMF notes, a move the fund heralded at the time as a decision that
would be "beneficial to all".
The purchase was part of a Group of 20 pledge in 2009 to
triple the IMF’s lending capacity to $750bn. Only two countries - the United
States and Japan - put up more money.
India, Russia and Brazil each pledged to buy up to $10bn in
IMF notes in 2009 and early 2010.
But China might face a backlash at home if it commits to any
more funding, especially if it were earmarked for assisting European countries investors consider risky borrowers. Ill-timed investments in some US banks
in the early days of the financial crisis were a costly embarrassment for
China’s sovereign wealth fund.
As for India, it has earned a reputation for being
risk averse in managing its $316bn worth of reserves. About 20% of that total
is invested in euro debt, and an Indian finance ministry official said last
week the proportion would not change.
Nabs and gabs
To be sure, the Brics have a vested interest in a stable
Europe. A full-blown European financial crisis would spare no one. China
exports more to the European Union than it does to the United States. Asia
draws far more credit from European banks than from American ones.
But even if the Brics upped their IMF commitments, it is
unclear whether that would do much to solve Europe's problems. The IMF has
restrictions on how and when it can lend. Any member country may request
financial assistance, but borrowers typically have to agree to an economic
programme laying out policy measures.
Neither Italy nor Spain has asked for help.
One place where additional funding could conceivably come in handy
is the IMF's New Arrangements to Borrow, a set of credit arrangements that gives
the fund access to about $591bn. That facility, known in IMF jargon as the NAB, was activated last spring for six months and is up for review in
November.
There is another, much smaller programme called the General
Agreements to Borrow, or GAB, which lets the IMF borrow a total of about $27bn
from 11 industrialised nations. None of the Brics countries is on that list.
As investor patience with European leadership wears thin,
the IMF will most certainly be under pressure to come up with new, politically
palatable ideas to contain Europe's debt strains and prevent them from
engulfing Italy or Spain.
Policymakers from deep-pocketed countries - including China - will no doubt be popular at this weekend's gathering.
But if the Brics hold the only hope for European rescue, the
EU, the IMF and the markets may be in for a big disappointment.
"The upshot is that we remain extremely sceptical of any
talk that China, the Brics, or other groups of emerging economies are ready or
able to come to the rescue of the eurozone," Capital Economics' Jessop said.