IT IS time to say goodbye to the confident reassurances from
American policymakers that Japan could not "happen here". It is also
time to regret the smug assertions that Japan's "lost decade" of
growth was due to a combination of uniquely Japanese failings - from
insufficient policy activism to weak corporate governance and poor political
leadership.
American policymakers, together with their European
counterparts, are realising something that Japan has been experiencing for a
while: it is very difficult to manage well an economy hobbled by structural
impediments and balance sheet excesses.
Absent a major change in the effectiveness of the policy
approach, this realisation will likely lead to broadening societal concerns
about the possible "Japanisation" of America and, with that, worries
that under such circumstances the country would not be able to navigate such a
phenomenon as well as Japan has.
The US continues to find it difficult to generate meaningful
economic growth and to create enough jobs. Despite multiple fiscal and monetary
stimulus programmes - indeed, record-breaking ones - the economy has failed to
recover decisively from the sharp contraction that followed the global
financial crisis.
With insufficient growth, un- and under-employment remain
distressingly high while the average duration of joblessness hits one
unfortunate record after another. To make a bad situation even worse, it is the
most vulnerable segments of the labour force - the young and the less educated - who are being hit the hardest.
In the process, society experiences a further deterioration
in already excessive inequalities in income and wealth.
Low growth means that America is unable to "safely
de-lever" from the financial excesses of the last decade. As a result, the
economy faces a risk of tipping into another recession.
Perplexities of post-bubble economies
A recession at this time would be terrifying - from an
economic, social, political and institutional perspective. In addition to the
country's unemployment crisis, almost a quarter of homeowners owe more in
mortgage debt than the value of their houses. With policy interest rates
floored at 0% for quite a while now and the fiscal deficit hovering at almost 9%
of gross domestic product, there is limited policy flexibility.
What America is discovering is something that Japan has
painfully known for a while: post-bubble economies are both complex and
perplexing.
It is not easy to bring back to sobriety an economy that
overdosed on leverage, debt and credit entitlement. It is doubly difficult when
it faces structural impediments to economic growth; when the political system
undermines all attempts at reform; and when the global economy is weakening and
being subjected to renewed financial fragilities.
I suspect that quite a bit will be written in the months ahead about the possible Japanisation of the American economy. That is the easy prediction. More difficult - and controversial - is the prediction that the emphasis of such work could well evolve over time to also assessing the similarities and differences between America and Japan when it comes to coping with many years of low growth without tipping into greater economic degradation and heightened social tensions.
The US lacks two important characteristics that have enabled Japanese society to cope relatively well with a difficult situation.
First, it
does not have the level of social cohesion that prevails in Japan. As such, it
does not have the same extent of societal safety nets that can be beneficial
during a time of sluggish growth.
Second, America has neither the net creditor status of Japan
nor the ability to generate surpluses on its balance of payments. As such, it
has less of a cushion, thereby increasing its medium-term vulnerability to
capital from abroad.
With these attributes, the US would find it much harder to
deal with many years of slow growth, sluggish job-creation and further income
and wealth inequalities. The economic costs would be higher, the financial
frailties greater, and the social consequences much more material.
This is yet another reason why the elected representatives
of the American people, and their appointed policy makers, must do more today
to internalise in their thinking the growing risk of economic
"Japanisation". They must also realise that the country has fewer
financial and societal cushions to deal with this risk should it materialise.
The sooner that happens, the greater the chance America can
use its still-considerable strengths to overcome its policy paralysis and
embark on much-needed - and much-discussed - measures to remove structural and
debt impediments to job creation and to higher and more inclusive economic
growth.
Against this background, it is encouraging to see the
administration recently propose a number of steps that, assuming congressional
cooperation, would serve as a foundation for further progress. This is
especially true for the jobs proposal, and also for the reforms to housing.
But much more needs to be done to urgently improve the key
enablers of sustained expansion, namely the functioning of the housing and
labour market, the process of credit intermediation, productivity-enhancing
infrastructure, and balancing immediate fiscal stimulus with medium-term reform
of both the revenue and spending side.
There was a time when America looked down on Japan for the
latter's inability to deal with its economic problems. No more. Like Japan,
America is now realising how difficult a post-bubble economy can be. The fear
is that it will also find out that that it lacks some of Japan's attributes
needed to cope with long years of economic stagnation.
The US has no time to waste to build on the important,
albeit small progress that has been made in recent weeks. If it does not, there
is a risk that the country's economic fate could end up being even worse than
what Japan has experienced. Everything possible should be done to minimise this
risk.
- Reuters
* Mohamed A El-Erian is CEO and co-CIO of PIMCO, and author
of a New York Times/Wall Street Journal bestseller When Markets Collide (2008).
The views expressed are his own.